In this paper, we consider a general time-inconsistent optimal control problem for a non homogeneous linear system, in which its state evolves according to a stochastic differential equation with deterministic coefficients, when the noise is driven by a Brownian motion and an independent Poisson point process. The running and the terminal costs in the objective functional, are explicitly dependent on some general discounting coefficients which cover the non-exponential and the hyperbolic discounting situations. Furthermore, the presence of some quadratic terms of the conditional expectation of the state process as well as a state-dependent term in the objective functional makes the problem time-inconsistent. Open-loop Nash equilibrium controls are constructed instead of optimal controls, by using a version of the stochastic maximum principle approach. This approach involves a stochastic system that consists of a flow of forward-backward stochastic differential equations and an equilibrium condition. As an application, we study some concrete examples.
Introduction
Time-inconsistent stochastic control problems have received remarkable attention in the recent years. The risk aversion attitude of a mean-variance investor [2] , [3] and [9] , such as the portfolio optimization with non-exponential discount function [6] and [7] , provide two well-known examples of time-inconsistency in mathematical finance. Motivated by these practical examples, this paper studies optimality conditions for time-inconsistent linear quadratic stochastic control problem, where the state is described by a n-dimensional non homogeneous controlled SDE with jump processes, defined on a complete filtered probability space (Ω, F , (F t Under some conditions, for any initial situation (t, ξ) and any admissible control u (.) the state equation is uniquely solvable, we denote by X (.) = X t,ξ (.; u (.)) its solution, for s ∈ [t, T ] . Different controls u (.) will lead to different solutions X (.) . To measure the performance of u (.) , we introduce the following cost functional
Q (t, s) X (s) , X (s) + Q (t, s) E t [X (s)] , E t [X (s)] + R (t, s) u (s) , u (s) ds + µ 1 (t) ξ + µ 2 (t) , X (T )
( 1.3)
The coefficients Q (., .) ,Q (., .) , R (., .) , G (.) ,Ḡ (.) , µ 1 (.) and µ 2 (.) are deterministic matrix-valued functions of suitable sizes, which explicitly depend on the initial time t in some general way. Our objective in this paper, is to investigate a general discounting linear quadratic optimal control problem for jump diffusions, which is time-inconsistent in the sense that, it does not satisfy the Bellman optimality principle, since a restriction of an optimal control for a specific initial pair on a later time interval might not be optimal for that corresponding initial pair. The novelty of this work lies in the fact that, our calculations are not limited to the exponential discounting framework, the time-inconsistency of the LQ optimal controls that we are going to consider, is due to the presence of some general discounting coefficients, involving the so-called hyperbolic discounting situations. In addition, the presence of some quadratic terms of the expected controlled state process, in either the running cost or the terminal cost, make the problem time-inconsistent, this can be motivated by the reward term in the mean-variance portfolio choice model. The term µ 1 (t) ξ + µ 2 (t) stems from a state-dependent utility function in economics [9] . Each of these terms introduces time-inconsistency of the underlying model, in somewhat different ways.
The main difficulty when facing a time-inconsistent optimal control problem is that, we cannot use the dynamic programming and the standard HJB techniques, in general. However, the main approach to handle the time-inconsistent optimal control problems, is by viewing them within a game theoretic framework. Nash equilibriums are therefore considered instead of optimal solutions, see e.g. [2] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [9] , [10] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [19] , [20] and [21] . The fundamental idea is that the control action that the controller makes at every instant of time, is considered as a game against all the control actions that the future incarnations of the controller are going to make. Strotz [19] , was the first who used this game perspective to handle the dynamic time-inconsistent decision problem on the deterministic Ramsay problem [16] . Then by capturing the idea of non-commitment, by letting the commitment period being infinitesimally small, he characterized a Nash equilibrium strategy. Further work which extend [16] , are [10] , [16] , [15] and [8] . Ekland and Lazrak [6] and Ekland and Pirvu [7] apply this game perspective to investigate the optimal investmentconsumption problem under general discount functions, in both, deterministic and stochastic framework. Then, by means of the so-called "local spike variation" they provide a formal definition of feedback Nash equilibrium controls in continuous time. The work [2] extends the idea to the stochastic framework where the controlled process is Markovian. In addition, an extended HJB equation is derived, along with a verification argument that characterizes a Markov subgame perfect Nash equilibium. In [19] , Yong studied a timeinconsistent deterministic linear quadratic model, and he derive a closed-loop equilibrium strategie, via a forward ordinary differential equation coupled with a backward Riccati-Volterra integral equation. Hu et al [9] studied a time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic control model, which is originated from the meanvariance portfolio selection problem with state-dependent risk aversion, and by means of variational method they derive a general sufficient condition for equilibria, through a new class of forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE in short) along with some equilibrium conditions. In [21] Yong investigate a time-inconsistent stochastic problem for stochastic differential equation. By introducing a family of N-person non-cooperative differential games he characterize a closed-loop equilibrium strategie.
The purpose of this paper is to characterize Nash equilibrium controls for a general time-inconsistent stochastic linear quadratic optimal control problem. The objective functional includes the cases of hyperbolic discounting, as well as, the continuous-time Markowitz's mean-variance portfolio selection problem, with state-dependent risk aversion. We accentuate that, our model covers some class of time-inconsistent stochastic LQ optimal control problem studied by [9] , and some relevant cases appeared in [20] . Note that, in [9] the weighting matrices do not depend on current time t and in [20] the terminal cost do not depend on current state ξ. Moreover, we have defined the equilibrium controls in open-loop sense (in a manner similar to [9] ), which is different from the feedback form (see [2] , [3] , [4] , [6] , [7] , [19] , [21] and [18] ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and formulate the objective. In Section 3 we present the first main result of this work (Theorem 3.2), which characterizes the equilibrium control via a stochastic system, which involves a flow of forward-backward stochastic differential equation with jumps (FBSDEJ in short), along with some equilibrium conditions. In Section 4, by decoupling the flow of the FBSDEJ, we investigate a feedback representation of the equilibrium control, via some class of ordinary differential equations, which do not have a symmetry structure. Section 5 is devoted to some applications, we solve a continuous time mean-variance portfolio selection model and some one-dimensional general discounting LQ problems. The paper ends with Appendix containing some proofs.
Problem setting
Let (Ω, F , (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P) be a filtered probability space such that F 0 contains all P-null sets, F T = F for an arbitrarily fixed finite time horizon T > 0, and (F t ) t∈[0,T ] satisfies the usual conditions. We assume that (F t ) t∈[0,T ] is generated by a d-dimensional standard Browian motion (W (t)) t∈[0,T ] and an independent Poisson measure N on [0, T ] × Z where Z ⊂ R − {0}. We assume that the compensator of N has the form µ (dt, dz) = θ (dz) dt for some positive and σ−finite Levy measure on Z, endowed with it's Borel σ−field B (Z). We suppose that
jump martingal rondom measure of N. Obviously, we have
where N denotes the totality of ν−null sets, and σ 1 ∨ σ 2 denotes the σ−field generated by σ 1 ∪ σ 2 .
Notations
Throughout this paper, we use the following notations:
• S n : the set of n × n symmetric real matrices.
• C ⊤ : the transpose of the vector (or matrix) C.
• ., . : the inner product in some Euclidean space.
For any Euclidean space H = R n , R n×m or S n with Frobenius norm |.| we let for any
•
) and ∂f ∂s (., .) are continuous .
Problem statement
We consider a n-dimensional non homogeneous linear controlled jump diffusion system
(2.1)
is the space of all admissible strategies. Our aim is to minimize the following expected discounted cost functional
. We need to impose the following assumptions about the coefficients 
(H2) The functions R (., .) , Q (., .) and G (.) satisfy
, see for example [11] . Moreover, we have the following estimate
for some positif constant K. The optimal control problem can be formulated as follows.
Problem (LQJ). For any given initial pair
Remark 2.1. 1) The dependence of the weighting matrices of the current time t, the dependence of the terminal cost on the current state ξ and the presence of quadratic terms of the expected controlled state process in the cost functional make the Problem (LQJ) time-inconsistent. 2) One way to get around the time-inconsistency issue is to consider only precommitted controls (i.e., the controls are optimal only when viewed at the initial time).
An example of time-inconsistent optimal control problem
We present a simple illustration of stochastic optimal control problem which is time-inconsistent. Our aim is to show that the classical SMP approach is not efficient in the study of this problem if it's viewed as time-consistent. For n = d = 1, consider the following controlled SDE starting from (t,
where b and σ are real constants. The cost functional given by
We want to address the following stochastic control problem.
Problem (E). For any given initial pair
At a first stage, we consider Problem (E) as a standard time consistent stochastic linear quadratic problem. Since J (t, x, .) is convex and coercive, there exists then a unique optimal control for this problem for each fixed initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R. Notice that the usual Hamiltonian associated to this problem is
Then the corresponding first order and second order adjoint equations are given respectively by dp
the last equation has only the solution (
. Note that, the corresponding H-function is given by
which is a concave function of v. Then according to the sufficient condition of optimality, see e.g. Theorem 5.2 pp 138 in [14] , for any fixed initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R, Problem (E) is uniquely solvable with an optimal controlū t,x (.) having the representation
such that the process (p t,x (.) ,q t,x (.)) is the unique adapted solution to the BSDE dp
By stadard arguments we can show that the processes (p t,x (.) ,q t,x (.)) are explicitly given by
is the solution of the state equation corresponding toū t,x (.) , given by
A simple computation show that
clearly we have
In the next stage, we will see that Problem (E) is time-inconsistent, for this we first fix the initial data (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R. Note that, if we assume that the Problem (E) is time-consistent, in the sense that for any r ∈ [t, T ] the restriction ofū t,x (.) on [r, T ] is optimal for Problem (E) with initial pair r,X t,x (r) , however as Problem (E) is uniquely solvable for any initial pair, we should have then ∀r ∈ (t, T ]
In particular by the uniqueness of solution to the state SDE we should havē
is the only optimal solution of the Problem (E), this contradict (2.5). Therefore, Problem (E) is not timeconsistent, and more precisely, the solution obtained by the classical SMP is wrong and the problem is rather trivial since the only optimal solution equal to zero.
Characterization of equilibrium strategies
The purpose of this paper is to characterize open-loop Nash equilibriums instead of optimal controls. We use the game theoretic approach to handle the time inconsistency in the same perspective as Ekeland and Lazrak [6] , Bjork and Murgoci [2] . Let us briefly describe the game perspective that we will consider, as follows.
• We consider a game with one player at each point t in [0, T ]. This player represents the incarnation of the controller at time t and is referred to as "player t".
• The t − th player can control the system only at time t by taking his/her strategy u (t, .) : Ω → R m .
• A control process u (.) is then viewed as a complete description of the chosen strategies of all players in the game.
• The reward to the player t is given by the functional J (t, ξ, u (.)). Note that J (t, ξ, u (.)) depends only on the restriction of the control u (.) to the time interval [t, T ] .
In the above description, we have presented the concept of a " Nash equilibrium point" of the game. This is an admissible control processû (.) satisfying the following condition; Suppose that every player s, such that s > t, will use the strategyû (s). Then the optimal choice for player t is that, he/she also uses the strategyû (t) .
Nevertheless, the problem with this "definition", is that the individual player t does not really influence the outcome of the game at all. He/she only chooses the control at the single point t, and since this is a time set of Lebesgue measure zero, the control dynamics will not be influenced. Therefore, to characterize openloop Nash equilibriums, which have not to be necessary feedback, we follow [9] who suggest the following formal definition inspired by [6] and [7] .
Noting that, for brevity, in the rest of the paper, we suppress the subscript (s) for the coefficients
, and we use the notation ̺ (z) instead of ̺ (s, z) for ̺ = E, F and c. In addition, sometimes we simply callû (.) an equilibrium control instead of open-loop Nash equilibrium control when there is no ambiguity.
We define an equilibrium by local spike variation, given an admissible controlû (.
(Ω, F t , P; R m ) and for any ε > 0, define
we have the following definition.
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium control for Problem (LQJ) if
for any t ∈ [0, T ] , and v ∈ L 2 (Ω, F t , P; R m ) . The corresponding equilibrium dynamics solves the following SDE with jumps
The flow of adjoint equations
First, we introduce the adjoint equations involved in the stochastic maximum principle which characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium controls of Problem (LQJ). Define the Hamiltonian H :
and denote byX (.) the corresponding controlled state process. For each t ∈ [0, T ], we introduce the first order adjoint equation defined on the time interval [t, T ], and satisfied by the triple of processes (p (.; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t)) as follows
where q (.; t) = (q 1 (.; t) , ..., q d (.; t)) . Similarly, we introduce the second order adjoint equation defined on the time interval [t, T ] , and satisfied by the triple of processes (P (.; t) , Λ (.; t) , Γ (., .; t)) as follows
where Λ (.; t) = (Λ 1 (.; t) , ...,
, see e.g. [11] . Moreover there exists a constant K > 0 such that
In an other hand, noting that the final data of the equation (3.5) is deterministic, it is straightforward to look at a deterministic solution. In addition we have the following representation
which is a uniquely solvable matrix-valued ordinary differential equation. Indeed, if we define the function Φ (s, .) for each s ∈ [0, T ] , as the fundamental solution of the following linear SDE
(3.8) Then, by standard arguments based on the Ito's formula we can prove that the triple (P (.; t) , Λ (.; t) , Γ (., .; t)) solution to (3.7) is explicitly given by
Next, for each t ∈ [0, T ] , associated with the 6-tuple û (.) ,X (.) , p (.; t) , q (., t) , r (., .; t) , P (.; t) we define the H t -function as follows H t (s, X, u) = H (t, s, X,û (s) + u, p (s; t) , q (s; t) , r (s, .; t)) + 1 2
where (s, X, u)
A stochastic maximum principle for equilibrium controls
In this section, we present a version of Pontryagin's stochastic maximum principle which characterize the equilibrium controls of Problem (LQJ). We derive the result by using the second order Taylor expansion in the special form spike variation (3.1). Here, we don't assume the non-negativity condition about the matrices Q, G and R as in [9] and [20] . The following theorem is the first main result of this work, it's providing a necessary and sufficient condition to characterize the open-loop Nash equilibrium controls for time-inconsistent Problem (LQJ). ; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t)) which satisfy the BSDE (3.4) and a deterministic matrix-valued function P (.; t) which satisfies the ODE (3.7), such that the following condition holds, for all u ∈ R m H t, t,X (t) ,û (t) + u, p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t) − H t, t,X (t) ,û (t) , p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t) 11) or equivalently, we have the following two conditions, the first order equilibrium condition 12) and the second order equilibrium condition
We point that the above result provides a characterisation of open-loop Nash equilibrium controls via a stochastic maximum principle which is not in the same setting that the classical stochastic maximum principle for optimal controls [22] in the sense that, the above result involves the existence of solutions X (.) , (p (.; t) , q (.; t) r (., .; t)) t∈[0,T ] to a "flow" of forward-backward stochastic differential equations parameterized by t ∈ [0, T ], while the Pontryagin's stochastic maximum principle for optimal controls involve only one system of forward-backward stochastic differential equation. Note that for each t ∈ [0, T ], (3.4) and (3.5) are backward stochastic differential equations. So, as we consider all t in [0, T ] , all their corresponding adjoint equations form essentially a "flow" of BSDEs. Moreover, there is an additional constraint (3.11) which is equivalent to the conditions (3.12) and (3.13) that acts on the flow only when s = t.
Our goal now, is to give a proof of the Theorem 3.2. The main idea is still based on the variational techniques in the same spirit of proving the stochastic Pontryagin's maximum principle [17] .
Letû (.) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R m ) be an admissible control andX (.) the corresponding controlled process solution to the state equation. Consider the perturbed control u ε (.) defined by the spike variation (3.1) for some
. Denote byX ε (.) the solution of the state equation corresponding to u ε (.). Since the coefficients of the controlled state equation are linear, then by the standard perturbation approach, see e.g. [17] , we havê 14) where y ε,v (.) and z ε,v (.) solve the following linear stochastic differential equations, respectively 15) and
Now, we present the following technical lemma needed later in this study, see the Appendix A.1. for its proof.
Lemma 3.3. Under assumption (H1), the following estimates hold
Moreover, we have the equality
Now, we are ready to give the proof of the Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.
Given an open-loop Nash equilibriumû (.), then for any t ∈ [0, T ] and v ∈ L 2 (Ω, F t , P; R m ) , we have clearly
from which we deduce
−H t, s,X (s) ,û (s) , p (s; t) , q (s; t) , r (s, .; t)
which leads to H t, t,X (t) ,û (t) + v, p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t) − H t, t,X (t) ,û (t) , p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t)
Therefore, by stetting v ≡ u for an arbitrarily u ∈ R m we obtain (3.11) . Conversely, given an admissible controlû (.) ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R m ) . Suppose that for any t ∈ [0, T ] , the variational inequality (3.11) holds. Then for any v ∈ L 2 (Ω, F (t) , P; R m ) it yields H t, t,X (t) ,û (t) + v, p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t) − H t, t,X (t) ,û (t) , p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, .; t)
Hence lim
is an equilibrium control. Easy manipulations show that the variational inequality (3.11) is equivalent to
then (3.12) and (3.13) follow respectively from the following first order and second order conditions of the maximum pointû = 0 for the quadratic function u → H t t,X (t) , .
∂H t ∂u t,X (t) , 0 = 0 and
Then, the required result directly follows.
In Theorem 3.2, in view of condition (3.11), as long as the term
for each t ∈ [0, T ] is sufficiently positive definite, the necessary and sufficient condition for equilibriums might still be satisfied even if R (t, t) is negative. This is different from [9] and [20] where the authors have assumed the non-negativity of the matrices Q, G and R in order to state their stochastic maximum principle for open-loop Nash equilibriums. Moreover, in view of (3.9) in the case where Q (t, s) ≥ 0 for every s ∈ [t, T ] , and G (t) ≥ 0, it follows that the solution of the second order adjoint equation satisfies P (t; t) ≤ 0, then if further we have R (t, t) ≥ 0, Thus the condition that
is obviously satisfied. Therefore, we summarize the main theorem into the following Corollary.
is an equilibrium control, if and only if, for any t ∈ [0, T ], there exists a triple of adapted processes (p (.; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t)) which satisfies the BSDE (3.4) , with only the first order condition (3.12) holds.
Linear feedback stochastic equilibrium control
In this section, we consider only the case where the Brownian motion is one-dimensional (d = 1) for simplicity of presentation. There is no essential difficulty with the multidimensional Brownian motions. All the indices j will then be dropped. Our goal is to obtain a state feedback representation of an equilibrium control for Problem (LQJ) via some class of ordinary differential equations. Suppose thatû (.) is an equilibrium control and denote byX (.) the corresponding controlled process. Then in view of Theorem 3.2, there exists a flow of triple of adapted processes (p (.; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t)) t∈[0,T ) for which the 3-tuple û (.) ,X (.) , (p (.; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t)) t∈[0,T ) solves the following flow of forward-backward SDE with jumps,
1) with the condition
Now, to solve the above stochastic system, we conjecture thatX (.) and p (.; t) for t ∈ [0, T ) are related by the following relation
for some deterministic functions M (.,
Applying Ito's formula to (4.3) and using (4.1), it yields dp (s;
and we obtain
By taking (4.6) and (4.7) in (4.2) we get
Thus if we assume that
exists, then we deduce thatû (.) admits the following feedback representation 8) where Ψ (t) and ψ (t) are given by
Therefore, for any (t, s) ∈ D [0, T ] , we have
Next, comparing the ds term in (4.5) by the one in (4.1) , then by using the expressions (4.8) and (4.10), we obtain
This suggests that the functions M (., .) ,M (., .) , Υ (., .) and ϕ (., .) solve the following system of ordinary
where
and Ψ (s) , ψ (s) are given by (4.9) .
Verification Theorem
The following theorem provides a verification argument.
) and ϕ (., .) be the solution of the system (4.11) . Thenû (.) given by (4.8) is an equilibrium control.
Proof. First, we can check that Ψ (.) and ψ (.) in (3.15) are both uniformly bounded. Then the following linear SDE
is uniquely solvable, and the following estimate holds
So the controlû (.) defined by (4.8) is admissible. Moreover, by definition of (p (s; t) , q (s; t) , r (s, z; t)) via (4.3), (4.6) and (4.7) , respectively, and by applying the Ito's formula, we can easily check that, for each t ∈ [0, T ] the processes (p (.; t) , q (.; t) , r (., .; t)) satisfy (3.4) .
Finally, in view of Corollary 3.4, it's remains to check that the condition (3.11) holds. To this end, we substitute (p (t; t) , q (t; t) , r (t, z; t) ,û (t)) taken from (4.3) , (4.6) , (4.7) and (4.8) , respecively, in the expression
we get Note that, the verification theorem (Theorem 4.1 ) assumes the existence of a solution to the system (4.11). However, since the ODEs which should be solved by M (., .) andM (., .) do not have a symmetry structure. The general solvability for this type of ODEs when (n > 1) remains an outstanding open problem. We will see in the next section two examples in the case when n = 1, this case is important, especially in financial applications as the mean-variance portfolio selection model. Also, we remark that a special feature of the case when n = 1 is that the state X (.) is one-dimensional, so are the unknown M (., .) ,M (., .) , Υ (., .) and ϕ (., .) of the system (4.11). This makes it easier to solve (4.11).
5 Some applications
Mean-variance portfolio selection problem
In this subsection, we discuss the continuous-time Markowitz's mean-variance portfolio selection problem. We apply Theorem 4.1 to obtain a state feedback representation of an equilibrium control for the Problem. In the absence of Poisson random jumps this problem is discussed in [9] .
The problem is formulated as follows: We consider a financial market, in which two securities are traded continuously. One of them is a bond, with price S 0 (s) at time s ∈ [0, T ] governed by
There is also a stock with unit price S 1 (s) at time s ∈ [0, T ] governed by
where r :
R are assumed to be deterministic and continuous, we also assume a uniform ellipticity condition as follow σ (t) 2 + Z γ (t, z) 2 θ (dz) ≥ δ, a.e, for some δ > 0. For an investor, a portfolio π (.) is a process represents the amount of money invested in the stock. The wealth process X x0,π(.) (.) corresponding to initial capital x 0 > 0, and portfolio π (.), satisfies then the equation
As time evolves, we need to consider the controlled stochastic differential equation parametrized by
(Ω, F t , P; R) and satisfiied by X (.)
The objective is to maximize the conditional expectation of terminal wealth E t [X (T )] , and at the same time to minimize the conditional variance of the terminal wealth Var t [X (T )] , over controls π (.) valued in R. Then, the mean-variance portfolio optimization problem is denoted as: minimizing the cost J (t, ξ, .), given by 5) subject to (5.4) . Here µ 1 , µ 2 : [0, T ] → (0, ∞) , are some deterministic non constant, continuous and bounded functions. The above model cover the one in [9] , since, in our case, the weight between the conditional variance and the conditional expectation depends on the current wealth level, as well as, the current time, while in [9] the weight depends on the current wealth level only. Hence, in the above model, there are three different sources of time-inconsistency. Moreover, the above model is mathematically a special case of the general LQ problem formulated earlier in this paper, with n = d = m = 1. Then we can apply Theorem 4.1 to obtain a Nash equilibrium control. We recall that, the definition of equilibrium controls is in the sense of open-loop, which is different from the feedback one in [3] , [4] and [22] . This completes the proof.
